The Industrial Military Complex

At the conclusion of World War II, the economist John K. Galbraith was appointed director of USBUS — United States Strategic Bombing Survey — which was tasked with assessing the effects of Allied aerial bombing on German industry and military. He summarizes the board’s findings:

In Germany the strategic bombing, that of industry, transportation and cities, was gravely disappointing. The war was not shortened. Attacks on factories that made such seemingly crucial components as ball bearings and eventually on aircraft plants were sadly useless. With plant and machinery relocation and better, more determined management, fighter aircraft production actually increased in early 1944 after major bombing. In the cities the random cruelty and death inflicted from the sky had no appreciable effect on war production or the war.1

Not only did the Allied command with the rest of the military establishment deny these findings, they persecuted Galbraith with the help of their allies in academia.

1 John, K. Galbraith, The Economics of Innocent Fraud, 54.